Introduction
The reach and persistence of very low levels of fertility in the industrialized world are unprecedented and have led numerous governments to question how best to support individuals in their fertility decisions, and especially how to allow them to reach their desired family size (Gauthier and Philipov 2008) . Such concerns about low fertility have been especially acute in some East and Southeast Asian countries where very low levels of fertility are perceived negatively by governments and have even led in some cases to the adoption of pronatalist policies (Chamie 2004) . Despite these concerns and policy interventions, the low levels of fertility remain, leading some scholars to characterize as unique such countries and areas as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Family Planning Perspectives 1987; McDonald 2008) . This chapter reflects on the determinants of low fertility and its related policies. Its more specific aim is to situate East and Southeast Asia in a cross-national perspective and to consider whether Asia is indeed unique or whether a combination of factors, common to other countries, can explain the observed very low levels of fertility observed there.
The chapter is organized around five themes: financial obstacles to fertility, workrelated obstacles, gender inequality in paid and unpaid work, normative obstacles, and other obstacles. Before examining these themes, I present some recent data on fertility in order to distinguish the regions to which I will be referring throughout the chapter. Table 2 .1 presents data on total period fertility rates for East and Southeast Asian countries, along with comparative data for five other geographical regions: Nordic countries, English-speaking countries, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe.
Regional Fertility Patterns
Obviously the East and Southeast Asian regions are very heterogeneous in their levels of development. If the analysis is restricted to higher-income countries, the average number of births per woman drops to 2.0 for Southeast Asia and to 1.2 for East Asia. These levels clearly place these two Asian regions in the category of very low fertility from a cross-national perspective. These figures, however, likely underestimate, in most countries, their true cohort fertility levels. For example, in 2003 the tempo-adjusted rates were estimated to be 1.52 for South Korea and 1.46 for Japan (Suzuki 2005, p. 25) , clearly higher than the nonadjusted rates, but still in the low fertility range. 1 In the rest of the chapter I turn to an examination of the obstacles to fertility. In doing so, I maintain the cross-national perspective but for some indicators restrict Table 2 .2 in the Appendix *Indicates countries that were classified by the United Nations as having a high level of human development on the basis of the UN's Human Development Index. This information was not available for Taiwan a The regional averages are unweighted for the size of each country b Detailed data for all other developed countries are provided in Table 2 .2 in the appendix my analysis only to selected Asian countries (because of data availability). I also focus mainly on low-fertility countries and neglect the Asian countries that have still not completed their fertility transition.
Financial Obstacles to Fertility
In the economic model of fertility developed by Gary Becker in the 1960s, it is assumed that individuals weigh the cost of children, their own income, and their preference for children (as opposed to other "consumer goods") when deciding whether or not to have a child (Becker 1991) . Financial constraints, along with a major increase in the cost of children, are thus, according to this model, the main reason for the decline in fertility to very low levels. The questions therefore are: How much do countries differ in these financial obstacles to fertility? And to what extent can these differences account for the observed cross-national differences in fertility?
Let us start with the income constraint. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, when economies were growing rapidly and job opportunities were numerous, the trends over recent decades have been characterized by numerous ups and downs. Not only is there less economic certainty in today's world, as illustrated by the recent financial crisis, but also earnings for some segments of the population have not kept pace with inflation. For example, the earnings of unskilled workers have stagnated since the 1970s and have even declined (in real terms) in numerous countries (OECD 1997) . This differential trend in earnings translates into very large differences between individuals in their financial obstacles to fertility. Similarly, high levels of unemployment observed in some countries, especially among young adults, have reduced the purchasing power of individuals and have likely forced them to postpone or to reduce their childbearing plans. 2 The rising cost of living, high unemployment, and uncertainties regarding governmental support for families are likely part of the explanation for the very low fertility levels currently observed in Central and Eastern Europe (Rostgaard 2004; Stewart and Huerta 2006; Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007) . In contrast, the relatively low unemployment, stable economies, and stable financial support for families that characterize the Nordic countries appear to be associated with much higher levels of fertility (Gauthier and Philipov 2008) . What about Asia? Could financial constraints be one of the reasons for the observed levels of fertility there?
There is no unanimity in the literature regarding the direct cost of children, and there are hardly any cross-national estimates. 3 What we have, however, are data on governmental financial support for families in the form of cash transfers and tax relief. Figure 2 .1 graphs the data for a two-child, two-earner family with an average income as compared with an equivalent childless couple. Across all countries for which data are available, the average value is 5.9 %, which should be interpreted as the additional disposable income of two-child families as compared with childless couples. In other words, it is the amount of governmental financial support for families with children. The cross-national differences are wide, with higher values (on average) observed in Western Europe and lower values in Southern Europe, Japan, and South Korea. 4 On the basis of these data, it is tempting to draw a causal relationship between cash support for families and fertility, since countries that provide higher levels of cash support for families tend also to be those where higher-than-average fertility levels are observed. The correlation is less than perfect, however, and does not explain, for example, the presence of higher levels of fertility in the English-speaking region despite average to low levels of cash support for families. 5 The above figures capture governmental support for families and not the cost of children itself. As mentioned above, there are no cross-nationally comparable estimates of the total cost of children in all countries. What we do know, however, is that when it comes to the cost of education, there are very large differences across countries. For instance, data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reveal that the share of private expenditures on education in South Korea and Japan by far exceeds that of all European countries. While across all OECD countries the share of private expenditures is about 15 %, it reaches about 30 % in Japan and 40 % in South Korea (OECD 2008) . Moreover, when the data are restricted to tertiary education, the share of private expenditures reaches 65 % in Japan and 75 % in South Korea, as compared with less than 30 % in most European countries. 6 In other words, when planning to have a child, parents and parents-to-be in Japan and South Korea anticipate having to spend a considerable amount of money for their children's education. In fact, the above figures likely underestimate the total private expenditures on education as they exclude expenditures outside educational institutions, such as private tutorials. This is a non-negligible component in countries like Japan and South Korea, where the competitive nature of the schooling system compels parents to enroll their children in after-school study programs and to hire private tutors. In large metropolitan areas in Japan, the estimates are that 70 % of middle-school age children are enrolled in after-school programs (Tsuya and Bumpass 2004).
Work-Related Obstacles
The indirect cost of children, also known as the opportunity cost, is perhaps an even bigger barrier to fertility in view of its larger magnitude than the direct cost of children. The estimates for a first child vary, but figures from Australia put it at USD $250,000, or 31 % of lifetime potential earnings (Breusch and Gray 2004) . Of course, theoretically the opportunity cost of children could be zero if a woman is eligible for maternity leave, if the benefits paid during this leave totally compensate her for the loss of earnings, if she can resume the same job after her maternity leave ends, if she does return to work after the end of her leave, if she does not experience any loss of promotion during her maternity leave or shortly after, and if she experiences continuous employment thereafter. The reality, however, is far from this "no cost" scenario for a large proportion of women. As shown by Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007a, b) the penalty associated with motherhood is non-negligible and varies widely among countries, being smallest in the Nordic countries and largest in Continental and Southern Europe. 7 It is true that not all women want to resume work after their maternity leave, some of them preferring instead to stay at home to take care of their young children. It remains that in today's economy a second earner is a must in many families. It is also encouraged by several governments.
Not surprisingly then, governments in most industrialized countries have put in place measures to make it easier for parents to combine work and family responsibilities and to reduce the opportunity cost of children. Those measures include maternity and parental-leave schemes, the provision of childcare facilities, and subsidies for childcare. Figure 2 .2 presents data on the combined maternity and parental-leave schemes in various countries. The data are expressed as full-time week equivalents in that they take into account both the duration of the leave and the cash benefits received during the leave. The cross-national differences are very large, with high support provided in the Nordic countries and some Eastern European countries and low support in the English-speaking countries and Southern Europe. In this graph, Japan and South Korea appear in the middle of the distribution. This is a new situation and reflects the recent adoption or extension of parental and childcare leave in those two countries.
The data tell us only one part of the story, however. Issues of eligibility for maternity and parental leave, job security after the period of leave, and possible job discrimination against young women need also to be taken into account in order to get the full picture. We do not have cross-nationally comparable data on all these dimensions. What we do know, however, is that a very high percentage of women in some Asian countries quit work after childbirth. In Japan the estimate is about 70 % (Atoh 2008) , while it is around 20 % in Europe (Del Boca 2003) . And while such a high exit rate from the labor market in Japan may reflect a combination of obstacles, including normative and structural ones, it considerably increases the opportunity cost of children.
The other major policy instrument for reducing the cost of children is the availability of affordable and high-quality childcare arrangements. During the past 20 years, many governments have put in place measures to support the creation of childcare facilities and to partly subsidize them through direct subsidies or through tax relief for parents. Figure 2 .3 reports the enrollment of children in formal childcare facilities and preschool services for children under the age of 3 (left-hand side) and those of age 4 (right-hand side). Regional and cross-national differences are very large, especially when it comes to children under age 3, with higher-thanaverage childcare provision in the Nordic countries and lower ones in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Japan and South Korea. The actual year of the data varies across countries, but all fall in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] Affordable childcare on its own is not sufficient, as parents may experience difficulties when their child is ill or when the care-giver himself or herself is ill. 8 While some employers will accommodate parents in such situations by allowing them to take time off, others will not. The struggle of working parents to look after a sick child is one of the key themes that emerged from interviews conducted by Jody Heymann (2006) and her team with mothers in several countries, including Russia, Vietnam, and the US. Their situation contrasts sharply with that of parents in countries like Sweden, where parents are eligible for numerous days off each year to take care of a sick child.
Gender Inequality in Paid and Unpaid Work
The provision of measures to help parents combine work and family responsibilities is important. But even when these are provided, parents may still face one additional barrier resulting from the combination of their paid job with their unpaid work at home. The term "second shift" was coined by Hochschild and Machung (1989) in their influential book, thus drawing attention to the very unequal gender division of household work. 9 It is not unusual for women to combine their 7 or 8 h of daily paid work with 4 or 5 h of unpaid work at home. The situation has been changing in recent years in some countries where men have increased their contribution to housework and childcare (Gershuny and Robinson 1988; Fisher et al. 2007 ). However, the division remains very unequal in most countries. Figure 2 .4 reports data on the ratio of father's to mother's time spent in childcare activities as calculated from time-use surveys. More equal gender contributions to childcare are observed in this graph in the Nordic countries, whereas less equal contributions are observed in Eastern Europe and especially in Japan. An unequal division of household labor between men and women can result from several factors, including time availability (itself linked to the number of hours of paid employment) and cultural norms regarding the roles of men and women. What is important to note again is the geographical ranking of countries and its plausible correlation with fertility.
Gender inequality, as a determinant of low fertility, has been discussed widely in the literature, the theoretical argument being that inconsistencies between norms and practices of gender equity in different institutional settings have a negative effect Japan, Statistics Bureau (2006) . Notes: The data for European countries refer to married or cohabiting parents whose youngest child was under the age of 7. Childcare activities, as defined here, refer to time directly engaged with the child-for example, playing with or reading to the child as well as transporting the child. The data for Japan refer to married couples (regardless of the child's birth order)) on fertility (McDonald 2000) . The persistence of very unequal gender norms in the private and public spheres in countries like Japan and South Korea is therefore undoubtedly part of the explanation for the observed very low levels of fertility in those countries. Again, a graphical illustration may be useful. Figure 2 .5 shows the correlation between the gender equality index (as computed by the World Economic Forum) and fertility. The correlation is less than perfect, but what is very noticeable is the position of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore at the low end of the continuum, with low levels of both gender equality and fertility. 
Normative Obstacles
In the economic model of fertility, the preference for children is a key element. This element is rarely the subject of investigation by economists, however, their attention being focused instead on more tangible obstacles to fertility, such as financial and work-related ones. Nevertheless, elements of the normative systems of societies influence not only the desired or expected number of children, but also their "quality"-that is, the amount of money, time, and energy that parents are expected to devote to their children. These norms, it may be argued, have changed and have contributed to the current below-replacement fertility levels. And while some-if not most-of these elements are out of reach for governments, they are nonetheless important to understand as they can seriously curtail the effectiveness of policies aimed at increasing or supporting fertility. 10 I call these barriers the normative obstacles to fertility and have identified five of them.
First, there is the fact that parents are nowadays under increasing pressure to spend more money on their children, a pressure spurred not only by our consumerism, but also by a desire to give children what is best for them. Parents especially want to give them a good head start in life, for example by enrolling them in the best schools, paying for private tutorials if needed, enrolling them in extra-curricular activities, etc. As mentioned already, this pressure, especially when it comes to education, seems to be particularly acute in some East and Southeast Asian countries and contributes to substantially increasing the cost of children. 11 Second, parents are under normative pressure to spend more time with their children and to do more with them and for them. For centuries, societies have been defining what is good parenting (see, e.g., Johansson 1987) . Especially in economically advanced countries, the expectations have risen in recent decades. Good parenting is no longer defined only as feeding and caring for children, but is also about spending a significant amount of time with children: conversing with them, involving them in family decisions, exposing them to culture and politics at a young age, etc. 12 Not all parents have the luxury of conforming to these pressures, and it is unclear whether the pressures are felt equally in different countries. But 10 To consider the possibility that governments can change norms would require a much lengthier discussion. It is certainly true that numerous examples exist in the developing world of governments that have fully endorsed family planning programs, and their endorsement may have indirectly contributed to changing norms toward smaller family size. Examples from the developed world of governments that may have succeeded in changing norms toward larger ideal family size would be much more difficult to find. 11 Some authors (e.g., Ogawa et al. 2009 ) have used the term "success-oriented" societies in referring to this phenomenon. 12 Evidence of such parenting pressures comes mainly from popular studies (e.g., Rosenfeld and Wise 2000). where they are felt they may be raising the cost of children to parents and causing couples to revise downward their fertility intentions. 13 Third, there are social pressures and expectations regarding the importance of achieving certain milestones prior to starting a family. For example, many young people, mainly from middle-class families, expect to have not only a good job prior to having children, but also to have traveled, to have found out "who they are" and what they are passionate about, and to have accumulated enough savings to buy a house or at least to rent a house or apartment in a comfortable and family-friendly neighborhood. And once they have children, they aspire (and are expected) to pursue their own development through such activities as fitness exercise, lifelong learning, and social activities. Obviously, these social pressures are difficult to reconcile with an early entry into parenthood and with having a large family. Of course, not all individuals are sensitive to these normative pressures, and different norms and expectations exist in different countries and even among different subgroups within the same society. Granting these differences, we should nevertheless not be surprised by a median age at first birth close to 30 years in some countries, nor by a low level of fertility.
Fourth, in some countries the social norm or expectation is still for couples to have children within marriage, following a traditional pattern of entry into parenthood. As young people increasingly favor cohabitation as a precursor, or even as an alternative, to marriage, such a social norm may act as an obstacle to fertility. Suzuki (2008, p. 37 ) even argues that it is the "weak familism in north-west Europe and English-speaking advanced countries that [has] prevented lowest-low fertility." In contrast, in Japan and South Korea the marriage norm, along with normative expectations about caring for elderly parents (Atoh 2008) , may act as a deterrent to fertility.
Finally, there are social norms regarding ideal family size. Until recently social scientists considered such norms to be mechanisms for keeping fertility around the replacement level. But recent studies indicate that the "ideal" family size appears to have dropped below replacement, for example in such countries as Austria and Germany (Goldstein et al. 2003) . The explanation given is part of the so-called fertility-trap hypothesis, which states that the persistence of low levels of fertility has affected societal perceptions of what is acceptable and desirable, thus lowering "ideal" fertility, and in turn contributing to keeping fertility at low levels (Lutz et al. 2006) . Similarly, it has been argued that when entire societies adjust to very low levels of fertility-for example, in terms of their standard of living, the stock of small houses, etc.-falling fertility may in itself be self-enforcing (see, e.g., Retherford and Ogawa 2006 ).
Other Obstacles
Other obstacles to fertility exist beyond those reviewed above. Among them are health-related problems, including the physiological difficulty of conceiving a child. It is difficult to quantify this obstacle. In the 2006 Eurobarometer survey, 13 % of men and 20 % of women in Europe identified health problems as one of the reasons why they were unable to fulfill their fertility desires (Testa 2006) . Results of a similar magnitude were reported from the 2003 German Population Acceptance Survey among childless women and men (Hara 2008) . Empirical evidence suggests an increase in the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in recent years. The use of such technologies varies widely across countries, partly as a result of national differences in the rules regarding their use and their coverage by public health insurance (Billari et al. 2007 ). Other obstacles are the lack of a stable partnership or marriage that some individuals may face when considering whether to have children, and disagreement between spouses about family size. It is difficult to quantify these obstacles or to even say whether they have increased over time. In Germany, around 60 % of childless men and women identified not having a steady partner as one of the reasons for not having children (Hara 2008) . In Japan, around 40 % of never-married men and women identified not having a suitable partner as one reason for not being married (Hara 2008) . And since marriage and childbearing continue to be closely linked in countries like Japan, obstacles to marriage are in turn also obstacles to fertility. Some scholars have interpreted these statistics as a reflection of an imperfect marriage market. Countries like Singapore have even taken steps to correct the situation by providing governmental matchmaking services (Singapore Government 2008) . Others have interpreted these statistics as a reflection of other obstacles, including the gap between men's and women's norms and expectations regarding gender roles (Jones 2007) .
Finally, the labor market should be singled out as a potential obstacle to fertility in some countries. The limited availability of part-time work (and the benefits associated with them) and the rigidity of labor markets in not accommodating exit and re-entry-especially after an absence of some years to look after a young child-are examples of factors that may adversely affect the career trajectories of women and their fertility decisions. 14 Labor market rigidities such as those observed in Japan, South Korea, and some European countries may therefore contribute to low fertility. In contrast, the more flexible labor markets of the US and other Englishspeaking countries may help explain their higher levels of fertility. 15
Conclusion
Why do people still want and still have children today despite all the obstacles identified here? A similar question was posed by Schoen and colleagues (1997) . Although this is an important question, it is one for which we have only a partial answer. It has been argued that some people still have children for the emotional satisfaction they provide, including the pleasure of nurturing, loving, and caring for a fragile human being. Others have children for more utilitarian reasons: to help consolidate a union or marriage, to build and create social capital, or to ensure companionship and support in old age. Pronatal and antinatal factors play out differently in various cultural settings and among various groups within those settings. The obstacles to childbearing appear to be particularly strong in some East and Southeast Asian countries and have resulted in unprecedentedly low levels of fertility.
One of the questions I posed at the beginning of this chapter was whether East and Southeast Asia is unique or whether a combination of factors (common to other countries) can explain its observed very low levels of fertility. On the basis of the evidence reviewed here, I would argue that the answer is both: The region is unique in that it has a unique combination of five factors that together contribute to very low levels of fertility. 16 First, there is the very high direct cost of children (which is in part the result of a competitive education system), combined with very low governmental financial support for families. Second, there is the very high opportunity cost of children that results from normative obstacles that prevent women from staying in the labor market after childbearing, together with a labor market that requires long hours of work, and low governmental support in the form of maternity and parental-leave schemes. Third, there is the persistence of very unequal gender norms regarding the division of paid and unpaid work, including the care of children and elderly parents, which makes marriage an unattractive option for many young women. This factor is not negligible, as an estimated 24 % of Japanese women from the 1990 birth cohort are expected to remain single (Atoh 2008) . Fourth, there have been increasing uncertainties about the future, especially about financial security. The economic slump of the 1990s and early 2000s in Asia has substantially changed the labor market, increasing the number of nonregular employees and jeopardizing job insecurity (Atoh 2008; Suzuki 2008) . Although we do not yet have data on the 2008-2009 economic crisis, we can expect it to add to the prevailing uncertainty, especially among young adults. Finally, other norms discourage family formation and fertility, including consumerism, individualism, and the acceptability of childlessness. And while these factors have been observed in other regions, what is unique in East and Southeast Asia is the coexistence of all of them.
Is fertility consequently bound to remain at very low levels in countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore? The total period fertility rate may increase slightly in the years ahead as people catch up on postponed births. Nevertheless, reducing the obstacles to fertility would require formidable changes to the labor market, the schooling system, governmental support for families, etc. Furthermore, while some of these obstacles are within the control of governments, others, including normative obstacles, are not.
Implementing pronatalist policies may not be a solution and may even provoke a backlash, as it implies governmental interference in what is perceived to be a fundamentally private decision. 17 A better solution may be the implementation of family-friendly and family-supportive policies, ones that make it easier for parents to combine work and family responsibilities, that reduce the cost of children to parents, and that are sensitive to gender equity. 18 We do not know the exact combination of policies that would most efficiently reduce the obstacles to fertility (Gauthier 2007) . What we do know is that governmental interventions, even modest ones, can increase the well-being of parents and children. Such policies, I would argue, may even have a positive effect on fertility, but only if they are designed to truly address the needs and preferences of parents and parents-to-be.
In recent years, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have bolstered their support for families by providing longer parental and childcare leave, increasing financial support for families, and planning to increase the provision of childcare facilities. It is too early to assess the impact of these policies on the ability of parents to combine work and family responsibilities, and perhaps even their effect on fertility. Some authors have already expressed doubt about their possible benefits in view of the relatively small amounts budgeted and the continued economic uncertainties (e.g., Suzuki 2008) . Governments are not the only actor, however. Without normative and policy changes in the labor market, the schooling system, and gender roles, obstacles to fertility will remain, further dampening the desire of young people to form a family. (2008) u-data unavailable a The geographic classification used here partly reflects the conventional typology of countries by welfare regime. The "Eastern European" region, however, is a very broad one and encompasses not only countries traditionally classified (e.g., by the United Nations) as Eastern European but also countries usually classified as Central European or Asian. Excluded from the analysis are Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey b Total period fertility rate (average number of births per woman) c Tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. The data come from the Vienna Institute of Demography (2008) . The method used to adjust the total fertility rates is the one suggested by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) d Canada is here classified among the English-speaking countries despite a nonnegligible Frenchspeaking minority concentrated mainly in the province of Quebec, which displays a significantly different pattern of family formation. Within-country differences are beyond the scope of this analysis
